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Valid Existing Rights and SMCRA's
Proscriptions on Mining
HAROLD P. QUINN, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
In Section 522(e) of the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977 [hereinafter SMCRA or the Act]', Congress
prohibited surface coal mining operations 2 within specifically
designated lands and prescribed distances of certain structures.'
Yet, Congress provided in the same section two generally appli-
cable exceptions to these otherwise per se proscriptions on min-
ing: operations in existence as of August 3, 1977, the date of
enactment; and, property interests constituting "valid existing
rights." For various reasons, not the least being the absence of
a statutory definition, the valid existing rights caveat to these
prohibitions has eluded a simple and accepted meaning under
SMCRA's regulatory regime.
This paper discusses the administrative history associated
with prior attempts to "flesh out" the meaning of valid existing
rights [hereinafter "VER"]. It re-examines the premise that un-
derlies those earlier regulatory excursions, and suggests some
considerations for the policy makers in their next attempt to get
their arms around this "elusive" term as it applies to private
property interests.
* Vice President and Counsel, National Coal Association; B.A., 1977, Denison
University; J.D., 1980 Wake Forest University.
' Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Aci of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91
Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988)).
1 The Act defines "surface coal mining operations" at § 701(28), 30 U.S.C. §
1291(28), and as a general matter includes activities conducted on the surface of lands
in connection with a surface or underground coal mine.
3 SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(l)-(5) lists a variety of public and private
areas which "subject to valid existing rights no surface coal mining operations except
those which exist on the date of enactment of this Act will be permitted...". 30 C.F.R.
§ 761.5 (1988) defines "surface coal mine operations which exist on the date of enact-
ment" as all operations "which were being conducted on August 3, 1977."
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I. PROTECTED AREAS AND STRUCTURES
Beyond the regulation of coal mining activities, Congress
also decided in SMCRA to protect a wide range of interests
through prohibitions on mining in Sections 522(e)(1)-(5). Because
of unique qualities, recreation or resource values, the Act sets
aside from surface mining the following public areas:
1. Any lands within the boundaries of the National Park
System; National Wildlife Refuge System; National System of
Trails; National Wilderness Preservation System; Wild and Sce-
nic Rivers System; and National Recreational Areas;
4
2. Any-Federal lands within a national forest; and,5
3. Operations which will adversely affect public parks and
publicly or privately owned places listed in the National Regis-
ter.
6
Because of the potential threat to public health and safety
from surface mining activities, Congress prohibited mining within:
1. 100 feet of a public road; and
7
2. 300 feet of any occupied dwelling, public building, school,
church or institutional building; and, 100 feet of a cemetery.'
In addition to the two generic exemptions for VER and
existing operations, other circumstances may exist which pre-
clude the application of what otherwise appear as per se pros-
criptions on mining. In some instances, the prohibitions simply
do not apply. Private holdings within the boundaries of a na-
tional forest do not fall within the proscriptions found in Section
522(e)(2). 9 Moreover, the prohibition on mining which adversely
affects historic places applies only to those actually listed, and
not places potentially eligible for listing in the National Regis-
ter.' 0
When the prohibitions apply and a potential mine operation
cannot avail itself of either the grandfather or VER clause,
4 SMCRA § 522(e)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(1).
SMCRA § 522(e)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(2).
6 SMCRA § 522(e)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(3).
SMCRA § 522(e)(4), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(4).
SMCRA § 522(e)(5), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(5).
Compare SMCRA § 522(e)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(1) (Any lands within the
National Park System) with SMCRA § 522(e)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(2)(Any federal
lands within national forest) (emphasis added). See Meridian Land and Mineral Co. v.
Hodel, 843 F.2d 340, 344 (9th Cir. 1988).
-o 30 C.F.R. § 761.11(c) (1988); See also In Re: Permanent Surface Mining Reg-
ulation Litig. 620 F. Supp. 1519, 1554 (D.D.C. 1985).
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discretionary authority exists to allow mining within or nearby
some Section 522(e) areas. For example, the Secretary of the
Interior may allow mining on national forest lands that do not
possess significant recreational, timber or economic values in-
compatible with mining, if the proposed operation is either an
underground mine or a western surface mine on lands without
significant forest cover."1 Mining may occur near publicly owned
parks or historic sites with the joint approval of the regulatory
authority and the agency with jurisdiction over the area. 12 The
prohibition on mining near a public road may be avoided by
closing or relocating the road, with the approval of the agency
responsible for the road. 3 Finally, an operator may obtain, from
the owner, a waiver of the 300-foot buffer zone around a dwell-
ing.'
4
The absolute nature of the statutory proscriptions on mining
is more apparent than real. Moreover, in some cases, VER will
present neither the initial nor last consideration in deciding
whether mining will proceed.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF VER
The applicability of the prohibitions themselves has been
gradually fleshed out over time. The grandfather clause which
exempts operations in existence as of SMCRA's enactment, ap-
pears straightforward enough, and thus, never engendered much
controversy. The most prominent caveat to the mining prohibi-
tions, VER, has eluded an accepted and simple meaning under
SMCRA. The Office of Surface Mining [hereinafter "OSM"]
twice promulgated final rules to define VER. Each attempt, like
many of the proposed rules under SMCRA, became a fertile
ground for litigation. The last proposal, in 1988, however, was
summarily withdrawn.
The two final rules focused upon avoidance of Fifth Amend-
ment takings, and thereby, any constitutional infirmity to the
application of the statutory prohibitions on mining. The admin-
istrative history of these rules discloses that the point of depar-
SMCRA § 522(e)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(2).
, SMCRA § 522(e)(3), 30 U.S.C § 1272(e)(3); See also 30 C.F.R. § 761.12(f)(1988).
13 SMCRA § 522(e)(4), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(4); See also 30 C.F.R. §§ 761.11(e)
and 762.12(d)(1988).
14 SMCRA § 522(e)(5), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(5); See also 30 C.F.R. § 761.12(e)
(1988) (Valid waivers and effect on subsequent purchaser).
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ture for the two efforts begins with defining the threshold that
regulatory action must exceed to constitute a "taking", as well
as the nature of property rights entitled to such constitutional
protection.
In 1979, OSM's first attempt to define this threshold pro-
duced a simple "mechanical test." This apparently limited the
VER exception to those owners of mining rights who had ob-
tained "all necessary permits" as of August 3, 1977, the enact-
ment date of SMCRA. 5 The second attempt at regulatory
guidance in 1983 sought to obviate any constitutional infirmity
to the mining prohibitions through a "generic takings" test,
which allows continued conformance with developing takings
jurisprudence. 6 While the "all permits" and "generic takings"
tests would deliver different practical results in the application
of the Section 522(e) prohibitions, both appear to start from the
common premise that the avoidance of "takings" was the sole
intent behind the VER caveat.
The last, and short-lived, attempt to define VER appeared
as a proposal with two divergent options: the "good faith-all
permits" and the "right to mine" tests. 7 Both options share a
common mechanical approach as compared to the "generic tak-
ings" test of 1983. Yet, the "right to mine" test also signals a
departure from the premise, found in the two prior attempts,
that takings concerns present the sole statutory objective behind
VER. In fact, the "right to mine" test appears more akin to the
VER concept embodied in other federal statutes.
A. The First Attempt: All Permits Test
OSM's first attempt to define VER excepted from the pro-
hibitions on mining those proposed operations which demon-
strated the right to mine coal as of August 3, 1977 and either:
(1) had obtained all necessary mining permits; or (2) could
demonstrate that the coal was needed for, and adjacent to, an
existing and permitted coal mining operation." In determining
the nature of the property right in existence as of August 3,
1977, the applicant had to demonstrate that the parties to the
11 44 Fed. Reg. 15,342 (1983).
16 48 Fed. Reg. 41,349 (1983).
,7 53 Fed. Reg. 52,383 (1988). OSM withdrew the proposal on July 21, 1989 (54
Fed. Reg. 30,557).
,1 44 Fed. Reg. 15,342 (1979).
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conveyance document actually contemplated a right to conduct
the type of mining activity proposed by the applicant. 19
The preamble explaining the 1979 rule discloses that OSM
viewed avoidance of any taking under the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution as the exclusive statutory intent behind VER. 20
From this premise, OSM gleaned two "theories" from its review
of takings jurisprudence: noxious use, and diminution in value.
OSM then made a conscious policy choice to apply the noxious
use to potential mines through the "all permits test," and dim-
inution in value to ongoing operations through the "need for
and adjacent to" test. In OSM's view, "[t]he takings cases reflect
less sympathy for property owners who are denied some future
opportunity to exploit their property interest based on prior
beliefs that the property would be available for development.
21
In other words, OSM apparently deemed the destruction of an
undeveloped mineral estate as within the proscriptions of the
Fifth Amendment. Yet, the agency believed that grave diminu-
tions in value of an ongoing operation contravened the takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment. One can only speculate how
OSM reconciled cases which upheld the government's prohibition
of the continuation of ongoing commercial activities, and their
creation of a rule which destroys completely the value of an
undeveloped mineral estate, while tolerating the expansion of an
ongoing enterprise of the same nature.
22
There was more to the 1979 rule than simply the "all per-
mits" test. The preamble mentioned the need for a case-by-case
application of the VER definition. Moreover, had the "all per-
mits test" comprised the exclusive meaning of VER for new
mines, the agency would not have needed to explain, as it did
in 30 C.F.R. Section 761.11(d)(1979), what VER "did not
mean" 23 Thus, in 1979, OSM established a case-by-case ap-
proach for VER, with the avoidance of uncompensated takings
remaining the objective. Satisfaction of the "all permits test"
clearly placed the applicant over this constitutional threshold.
24
Id. (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(c)(1979)).
o 44 Fed. Reg. 14,992 (1979).
21 Id.
2 See eg., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
23 44 Fed. Reg. 14,992 (1979) (The mere expectation to mine does not constitute
VER, e.g. coal exploration licenses, application or bids for leases).
, Id. at 14,994.
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B. The Second Attempt: Generic Takings Test
OSM embarked upon its second attempt to provide regula-
tory guidance for VER in the wake of litigation over the 1979
"all permits test." In In Re Permanent Surface Mining Regu-
lation Litigation,25 the district court remanded the "all permits
test" so the agency could revise the definitions of the test. The
court wanted the definitions to reflect that the all permits test
encompassed property rights recognized as valid under state
law; 26 and, that a good faith attempt to obtain all permits before
August 3, 1977 would satisfy the test. 27 Some may contend that
the court's modification of the "all permits test" demonstrates
judicial approbation of a permit test. Yet, the context of the
challenge militates against such a reading. As conceded by the
agency, the coal industry contended that the rule failed to protect
property rights recognized as valid under state law. 21 Moreover,
the agency's defense to the 1979 rule amplified the preamble
explanation that VER determinations occur on a case-by-case
approach, with the "all permits test" as merely the unequivocal
qualification for VER.
Apparently OSM did not view the court decision as judicial
approbation for equating VER with a permits test. In 1982,
OSM proposed for public consideration the following three me-
chanical type tests: (1) modified permits test as suggested by the
court; (2) ownership of the coal; and (3) right to mine. 29 In
apparent reluctance to adopt an underinclusive or overinclusive
standard with respect to potential takings considerations, OSM
abandoned the mechanical tests. Instead, the agency promul-
gated the "generic takings" standard which established takings
jurisprudence as the sine qua non for VER. In other words, a
person possesses VER if the application of any of the prohibi-
tions in Section 522(e) would effect an uncompensated taking of
a property interest that existed as of August 3, 1977.10
Again, OSM's rule started from the same premise as the
1979 rule that "Congress created the valid existing rights exemp-
25 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1083 (D. D.C. 1980).
26 Id. at 1090.
2I Id. at 1091.
8 Id. at 1090.
29 47 Fed. Reg. 25,279-82 (1982).
30 48 Fed. Reg. 41,349 (1983) (Codified at 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1988)).
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tion .. . to avoid potential legislative takings ... "31 The ge-
neric test followed from an enhanced appreciation of the case-
by-case approach evinced in takings jurisprudence. OSM con-
cluded, with some modesty, that the agency was no more capable
than the Supreme Court of establishing a specific formula to
avoid takings for a broad array of circumstances.3 2 Furthermore,
the agency saw some benefit in a definition that "allow(s) the
agency to conform the determination of valid existing rights to
the continuing development of takings law in the courts." 33
Similar to its predecessor, the "generic takings" test also
failed to survive judicial scrutiny. In In Re: Permanent Surface
Mining Regulation Litigation (II),a4the district court remanded
the definition on procedural grounds. The court found that the
Administrative Procedure Act required a new notice and com-
ment period35since the final rule departed so substantially from
all three options published in the proposal.
It is readily apparent from the administrative history that
OSM's endeavors to define VER in the context of a "takings"
standard has left little in the way of certainty. One might debate
endlessly the appropriate application of taking jurisprudence to
the coal industry in the context of the prohibitions it confronts
in Section 522(e). Nonetheless, the all permits formula, which
equates a coal owner's reasonable investment backed expectation
to participation in a regulatory regime prior to SMCRA's date
of enactment, falls short of the task of avoiding a taking.3 6
However, a more fundamental issue still remains unresolved. Is
legislative takings the sine qua non for VER under SMCRA? If
not, then what other guidance does the statute, its legislative
history and, perhaps, other statutes provide the agency?
, Id. at 41,313.
12 Id. at 41,314.
11 Id. It remains unclear whether OSM meant that it would conform its own
internal decision making on VER to the developing jurisprudence, or merely pass the
more difficult cases to the courts through applicant appeals. The generic standard also
raises serious implications for administrative review since the Interior Board of Land
Appeals, the administrative review body of the Department of the Interior, has held that
it lacks jurisdiction to consider constitutional objections to decisions of the agency. See
The Stearns Co., 110 IBLA 345, 350 (1989).
22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1557 (D. D.C. 1985).
Id. at 1564.
36 See Macleod & Means, When Is It Suitable to Be Unsuitable. An Analysis of
the Exemptions From the Surface Mining Act's Prohibition on Mining, 3 E. MLN. L.
INST. § 7.03[5][b] (1982); See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Association, 452 U.S. 264, 296 n. 37 (1981).
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III. TAKINGS OR PRESERVATION OF THE STATUS Quo
The 1979 and 1983 policies which view the avoidance of
legislative takings as the sole purpose of VER rest upon a
selective reading of the statute's structure and history.3 7 Despite
the voluminous legislative history associated with SMCRA, the
1979 rule relies upon a single passage to support the premise
that Congress intended nothing more than avoidance of takings
when it inserted the VER caveat in Section 522(e). 38 The one
passage relates to Congressmen Udall's (D-Az.) opposition to an
amendment to delete the VER caveat from the legislation.
39
According to Congressman Udall, deletion of this general excep-
tion to the otherwise per se mining prohibitions would require
"paying compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution. '" 40 Even in the absence of other legislative history, this
admonition does not necessarily mean that Congress simply in-
tended to avoid payment of compensation. Rather, Congressman
Udall identified one readily apparent consequence to follow from
the deletion of the VER exception to Section 522(e). Signifi-
cantly, the provision at issue in the amendment did not involve
Section 522(e), but rather, the petition process to designate non-
coal lands unsuitable for mining under Section 601 of the Act.
4'
A. A Reassessment Of The Legislative History
Fortunately, the legislative history offers more pertinent pas-
sages which address VER and issues related to private property
rights. In contrast to the isolated "takings" passage cited by
OSM, other passages evince a pervasive theme of maintaining
the status quo for existing property rights under state law.
Legislation considered in the Ninety-third Congress discloses
two distinct approaches to the per se prohibitions. The 1973
Senate Bill, S. 425, provision for the designation of lands un-
suitable for mining, proscribed mining within only those areas
now set forth in Sections 522(e)(1) and (3) of the 1977 Act, with
17 The agency has not been entirely resolute in their conviction. See 47 Fed. Reg.
25,278 (1982) and 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (1988) (Proposed rules with "right to mine"
tests).
3 44 Fed. Reg. 14,992 (1979); The 1983 rule, without citation, simply reaffirmed
this reading of the statute and its history. 48 Fed. Reg. 41,313 (1983).
39 44 Fed. Reg. 14,992 (1979).
• 123 Cor . REc. H12,878 (daily ed. April 29, 1977) (statement of Rep. Udall).
4 SMCRA § 601(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1281(d).
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an exemption for existing mine operations. 42 The 1974 House
Bill, H.R. 11500, provision for permit review sought to protect
a broader array of public and private interest by barring permit
approval for any application which included the same areas and
structures listed in Sections 522(e) of the 1977 Act.43 The Bill
did not provide a general exemption. It did exempt existing
operations, as well as those with substantial legal and financial
commitments, which were mining within the areas the 1977 Act
designates in Section 522(e)(1) and (2)." With little discussion,
the House Conference Report for the 1974 legislation reorgan-
ized these prohibitions into the unsuitability provision of Section
522(e), and inserted both of the generally applicable exemptions
found today: existing operations and VER.
41
The Conference Committee's discussion of valid existing rights
explains that "the language of Section 522(e) is in no way
intended to affect or abrogate previous state court decisions".
46
The passage proceeds to explain the need to construe the lan-
guage of deeds in accordance with local custom, usage and state
law. If anything, the Conference Report leaves an impression
that the VER caveat neither diminishes nor expands existing
property rights under state laws, but simply preserves the status
quo. 47 A similar tone was echoed in subsequent discussions of
substantially identical legislation considered in later Congresses,
as well as the legislation actually enacted.41
Much of the discussion on valid existing rights appeared in
the context of split mineral and surface estates, particularly on
42 S. 425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1978); see S. REP. No. 402, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
20 (1973).
43 H.R. 11,500, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); see H.R. REP. No. 1072, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 11-12 (1974).
- H.R. 11,500 also contained separate provisions for surface owner consent and
pre-existing waivers for severed surface and mineral estates. H.R. Rep. No. 1072, supra
note 43 at 46. It would appear from the structure and history of H.R. 11,500 that
consent or a prior waiver would save an operator from the ban on permit approval only
with respect to the 300-foot buffer zone around an occupied dwelling.
41 H.R. CONF. Rap. No. 1522, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 53-54 (1974).
" Id. at 85.
47 Id. (VER not intended to open "lands to strip mining where
previous precedents have prohibited stripping").
" See e.g. H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. ADm m. Naws 593, 631; H.R. REP. No. 896, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 48
(1976); S. CONF. REp. No. 101, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1975). See also H.R. REP. No.
218 at 189 (separate views of Rep. Lujan)(It would be contrary to the intent of the Act
for anyone to argue that Section 522(e) modifies the relationship between the owners of
the surface and subsurface rights).
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public lands. To this end, Congress' treatment of the issue in
other provisions of SMCRA provides additional guidance on its
intent for VER. Recall that the House version of the 1974
legislation, H.R. 11,500, embodied the per se prohibitions within
the provisions for permit approval, and had separate provisions
for surface owner consent. 49 Both the House and Senate resolved
to place the per se prohibitions in Section 522(e), and limit the
surface owner consent provision to federal coal.5 0 However, in
1977, the House revived the surface owner protection concept
for private lands in the permit approval provisions of H.R. 2.51
The Committee Report explains that the provision:
[Ijincludes a new condition for permit approval designed to
assure that coal rights which have been severed from the sur-
face estates will not be surface mined unless the parties to the
severance, or the surfaceowner or his assignee, contemplated
that the coal would be extracted by surface mining methods.
'52
The Senate's treatment of split estates left to state law:
[t]he resolution of any disputes about property rights which
might arise from such separations, and this Act does not
attempt to tamper with such state laws. The Committee firmly
believes that all valid existing property rights must be pre-
served, and has no intention whatsoever, by any provision of
this bill, to change such rights.
' 53
The Conference resolved to maintain a "procedural require-
ment" for evaluating the split estate in the context of the permit
applicant's showing a legal right to enter and mine by surface
methods. However, the final legislation deleted the House Bill
provision that silence in the severance instrument established a
presumption to limit the authorization to mine "to methods
customarily used in the state at the time the conveyance was
executed".14 If the conveyance instrument was silent on surface
mining, the determination of the mineral right owner's, or suc-
cessor in interest's, right to mine by surface methods would "be
made in accordance with state law."
'55
49 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
,0 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
11 H.R. REP. No. 218, supra note 48 at 26.
52 Id. at 66.
,1 S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 56 (1977).
H.R. REP. No. 218, supra note 48 at 26.
, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1977).
[VOL. 5:741
PROSCRIPTIONS ON MINING
This history of the legislation discloses an inextricable con-
nection between the prohibitions on mining and the concern
some members of Congress expressed with the dominant nature
many state laws accorded the mineral estate over the surface
estate under severance deeds.5 6 The resolution of this issue, by
the Conference Committee for the legislation finally enacted as
SMCRA, provides ample guidance for both the meaning of VER
and the appropriate context for its determination. Simply stated,
VER means nothing more than the demonstration that the ap-
plicant possesses the "legal right to enter and commence surface
mining operations on the area affected." 5 7 Additional procedural
protections were inserted in Section 510(b)(6) of SMCRAS5for
determinations with respect to severed estates, where the appli-
cant must demonstrate: surface owner consent; an express res-
ervation or grant in the conveyance that authorizes surface
mining; or, in the absence of an express grant, "legal authority
under applicable state law that the language of [the conveyance]
instrument gives the right to mine by surface methods." 5 9
A construction of the VER clause as simply a preservation
of established property rights also comports with the pervasive
theme throughout SMCRA to defer to state law on such mat-
ters. 60 In addition to the standard for evaluation of an operator's
right to mine, 6' the provisions in SMCRA for liability insurance
coverage and the allocation of water rights likewise defer to state
law.
62
The permitting procedures give an especially appropriate con-
text to evaluate VER through a concrete proposal to mine as set
forth in a permit application. The permit information require-
ments supply precisely the information necessary to evaluate
both the application of the statutory prohibitions and the validity
of the proposed mining activity against the legal documents
submitted to demonstrate the right to enter and commence min-
56 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text; See also 121 CONG. REc. H6679
(March 14, 1975) (Colloquy on mining prohibitions and surface owner protections).
57 SMCRA § 507, 30 U.S.C. § 1257(b)(9).
Is SMCRA § 510, 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(6).
19 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 493, supra note 55, at 106.
6 Cf. National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 750, 757 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Meridian Lands & Minerals Co. v. Hodel, 843 F.2d 340, 346 (9th Cir. 1988).
6-1 SMCRA §§ 507(b)(9) and (b)(6), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1257(b)(9) and (b)(6).
62 SMCRA §§ 507(f) and 717(a), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1257(f) and 1307(a).
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ing. 63 On the other hand, the generic takings test invites requests
for "advisory" determinations well before the submission of a
specific proposal to mine. 64 Thus, in many instances, the VER
determination under the "generic takings" test may comprise
little more than a "facial," and not a "factual," inquiry into
the economic impact attendant to the application of the Section
522(e) mining prohibitions. 65 In short, the "generic takings"
approach fosters precisely the limited inquiry that takings juris-
prudence advises against; one which requires a dispositive an-
swer.66
B. Collateral Guidance
The historical application of VER in numerous other statutes
may provide the Department of the Interior with the fortitude
to abandon the past approach of simply avoiding uncompensated
takings. Instead, this application defines the term more tradi-
tionally: preserving existing property rights. The term has exten-
sive history under diverse statutory schemes for the disposition
and development of public lands.
67
The absence of a statutory definition for VER in other
statutes does not appear to have unduly hampered the Depart-
ment's efforts to resolve its meaning.68 Generally, on public
63 See SMCRA § 507(b)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1257(b)(1) (Names of legal owner of
surface and mineral); SMCRA § 507(b)(7), U.S.C, § 1257(b)(7)(Method of mining);
SMCRA § 507(b)(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1257(b)(9)(Map of affected areas with legal documen-
tation for right to mine); SMCRA § 507(b)(13), 30 U.S.C. § 1257(b)(13)(Map depicting
man made features; and legal owners of lands adjacent to permit area); SMCRA §
510(b)(6), 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(6)(Severance information).
- 30 C.F.R. § 761.12(h) (1988); 48 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1983); See also 55 Fed. Reg.
4,913 (1990) (VER request for mining within Daniel Boone National Forest); 55 Fed.
Reg. 2,163 (1990) (VER request for Monongahela National Forest).
65 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. at
295.
, See e.g. Ramex Mining Corp. v. Watt, 753 F.2d 521, 524 (6th Cir. 1985);
Ainsley v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 394, 399-400 (1985). However, one must seriously
question how the Interior Board of Land Appeals can provide, under 30 C.F.R. § 4.1390
(1989), meaningful administrative review of a VER determination under a "takings"
test when it cannot entertain constitutional objections to the application of agency rules.
See The Stearns Co., 110 IBLA 345, 350 (1989).
67 See e.g. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), Pub. L.
94-579, § 701(h), 90 Stat. 2744, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (note)(1982); Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-377, §§ 4 and 13, 78 Stat. 710, 30 U.S.C. §§ 201
and 204 (note)(1982).
" For a discussion of the development of VER under public land statutes, See
Note, Regulation and Land Withdrawals: Defining "Valid Existing Rights", 3 J. MIN.
L. & POL'Y 517, 526-537 (1988).
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lands, the Department of the Interior has distinguished "vested
rights" from "valid existing rights." Vested rights are those
property interests sufficient to pass equitable or legal title.
69
Valid existing rights are property interests short of vested rights,
which continue to remain immune from extinguishment by the
exercise of agency discretion. 70 For example, some public lands
statutes prescribe certain requirements, that once satisfied, create
a valid existing right without the need for further discretionary
approval by the agency.7' In other circumstances, the exercise of
discretion may create valid existing rights. For example, a min-
eral lease, once issued by the agency, creates a valid existing
right in the lease.
7 2
The property interests traditionally afforded protection under
VER clauses in other statutes fall well short of those typically
confronted under an applicant's right to mine under SMCRA.
However, the severed estate, which preoccupied Congress in
SMCRA, appears more akin to "vested rights" which fall well
within the VER protection of other statutes. Moreover, the
principles often discussed with VER under public land statutes
strike the same chord sounded in the legislative history of
SMCRA: equity, fairness and preservation of the status quo.
73
When Congress enacted the Federal Coal Leasing Amend-
ments Act 74 in 1976, it repealed, subject to VER, several provi-
sions of the leasing program including the preference right leasing
system for coal. The Senate Committee's explanation of the
VER caveat sounds remarkably similar to the one it provided
for SMCRA. The stated intent is "to maintain the status quo
with respect to any such rights, and not to enlarge or diminish




The collateral guidance provided in other federal statutes
supply a compelling reason to view the VER caveat under
SMCRA as simply the preservation of existing property rights
69 Solicitor's Op. 88 I.D. 909, 912 (1981). See also E. BAYNARD, PUBLIC LAND
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.23 (1986).
- Solicitor's Op., 88 I.D. 909, 912 (1981).
71 Id.
72 Id. Even interests less than leaseholds may constitute a valid existing right. See
N.R.D.C. v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
71 See Peabody Coal v. Andrus, 477 F. Supp. 120 (D. Wyo. 1979); Williams v.
Brening, 51 I.D. 225 (1925).
74 30 U.S.C. § 201(b).
7, S. REP. No. 296, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1975), compare with, S. REP. No.
128, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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from extinguishment by the application of the Section 522(e)
mining prohibitions. Past usage should, if not control, at least
provide persuasive weight for a definition that goes beyond the
single premise of avoiding takings. 76 Furthermore, arriving at a
definition by borrowing the meaning of a commonly used term
from another statute has precedent under SMCRA.
77
The apparent parallel between the VER caveat in SMCRA
and other federal statutes did not completely bypass the De-
partment of the Interior. However, in the 1979 rulemaking proc-
ess, the Department simply dismissed the relevance of the historic
interpretation of VER. In the agency's view:
[SMCRA] changed the context of VER significantly because it
makes clear that surface coal mining on any private or federal
lands is not an absolute right, but is subject to approval after
the regulatory authority has determined that reclamation to
the standards of the Act can be achieved. Thus, at least as of
enactment of the Act, landowners no longer have an uncon-
ditional right to mine.
7
As several commentators have observed, this response em-
bodies circular, if not backward, reasoning. 79 Rather than em-
ploying the traditional analysis which evaluates the extent of the
property right or interest which existed prior to the enactment
legislation, the Department instead used the extent of regulation
under SMCRA to circumscribe the extent of the pre-existing
right.8 0 This approach turns the historical VER analysis on its
head. The question of the extent of regulation is secondary to
the first inquiry of determining the nature of the property right
or interest itself. No one contends that VER also carries with it
the unfettered right to mine without adherence to the exacting
permit and environmental protection standards in SMCRA. Ac-
cordingly, a VER definition that preserves existing property rights
under state law would not allow for the total impairment of the
76 See Macleod & Means, supra note 36 at § 7.03[51[c1.
77 See U.S. v. Dix Fork Coal Co., 692 F. 2d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 1982) (Applying
for purposes of SMCRA the definition of "agent" under the Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 802(e)).
71 44 Fed. Reg. 14,993 (1979).
19 See 3 J. Min. L. & PoL'Y, supra note 68 at 544; Macleod & Means, supra note




values protected in Section 522(e) of the Act, as some maintain.8 1
CONCLUSION
The obsession with legislative takings distinguishes the VER
experience under SMCRA from that under other statutes which
use the same term. The paucity of direct and collateral support
for this singular premise compels a reassessment of the legislative
history and the agency's prior repudiation of the historical for-
mula developed under public lands statutes. A fresh look should
disclose a distinction only in context because of SMCRA's ap-
plication to private mineral interests. However, no such distinc-
tion exists in the intent to maintain the status quo of property
rights in existence prior to enactment. The provisions for SMCRA
permit approval give an appropriate procedural context, and
substantive standard, to render VER determinations, particularly
for severed surface and mineral estates. When confronted with
the areas listed in Section 522(e), a VER determination comprises
nothing more or less than the evaluation performed everyday by
the regulatory authority. It is the determination of the permit
applicant's legal right to enter and commence surface mining
operations on the proposed permit area.
Any impairment of the values protected under SMCRA Section 522(e)(1), 30
U.S.C. § 1272(e)(1), appears remote in view of the Department of Interior's "Statement
of Policy" that the Department will preclude mining on any lands within the boundaries
of these listed areas by the acquisition of any valid existing rights through exchange,
purchase or condemnation. 53 Fed. Reg. 52,384 (1989). See also 30 C.F.R. § 761.11(h),
suspended, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,961 (1986) (bar on mining, licensing or exploration on any
federal lands listed in SMCRA § 522(e)(1)).
1989-901

